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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Darcy Murphy appeals the district court's decision to revoke his probation, or 
alternatively, its decision to not reduce his sentence at that time. He asserts that 
decision constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. As part of his appeal, 
Mr. Murphy requested that several transcripts be produced and augmented to the 
appellate record, but the Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion. Mr. Murphy 
contends this constitutes a violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection. 1 As a result, this Court should grant Mr. Murphy access 
to the requested transcripts and allow him the opportunity to file supplemental briefing 
raising any issues arising from review of those transcripts. In the event that request is 
denied, this Court should still vacate the district court's order revoking probation and 
executing the underlying sentence without modification and remand the case for a new 
disposition hearing. Alternatively, it should reduce Mr. Murphy's sentence as it deems 
appropriate. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Murphy pied guilty to driving under the influence pursuant to a plea 
agreement. (R., p.36.) That was Mr. Murphy's first felony offense. (See Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-6.)2 The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, on Mr. Murphy, but decided to retain 
1 Mr. Murphy recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court recently heard argument in a 
case raising similar issues. State v. Brunet, Docket No. 39550. Obviously, the decision 
in that case may affect or resolve some of the issues raised in this brief. 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"MurphyPSI." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents attached 
thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, etc.). 
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jurisdiction. (R., pp.48-51.) Later, the rider staff reported that Mr. Murphy performed 
well during the period of retained jurisdiction. (See PSI, pp.99-106.) They anticipated 
he would complete all his assigned programs. (PSI, p.100.) Therefore, they 
recommended that he be placed on probation. (PSI, p.99.) The district court did so, 
suspending Mr. Murphy's sentence for a ten-year period of probation. (R., p.82.) As a 
term of that probation, the district court ordered Mr. Murphy to complete drug court. 
(See R., p.71.) 
However, Mr. Murphy was not as successful in the drug court program as he had 
been in the rider program. (See, e.g., Tr., p.18, Ls.11-21.) He admitted that he failed to 
complete the program, and thereby violated his probation. (R., p.107.) As a result, he 
agreed to be discharged from drug court. (Tr., p.5, Ls.16-18.) At the disposition 
hearing on that matter, the State, pointing to Mr. Murphy's criminal history and the fact 
that he had been given the opportunity to participate in both the rider and drug court 
programs, asked the district court to execute the underlying sentence. (Tr., p.14, 
L.12 - p.15, L.7.) Mr. Murphy asked the district court to consider returning him to 
probation for another shot at drug court since, as his attorney pointed out, he had begun 
to show some insight into his actions. (Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.17, L.6.) In the alternative, he 
requested the district court exercise its authority pursuant to 1.1.C.R. 35.R. 35 and 
modify his sentence from a unified, ten-year sentence with, three years fixed, to a 
unified, ten-year sentence, with only two years fixed. (Tr., p.17, Ls.12-15.) Defense 
counsel pointed out that exercising this authority would allow Mr. Murphy to get into 
prison rehabilitation programs more quickly and would potentially allow him the 
opportunity for placement in a work center. (Tr., p.17, Ls.15-17.) However, the district 
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court, also pointing to Mr. Murphy's criminal history, executed Mr. Murphy's sentence 
without modification. (Tr., p.18, L.11 - p.19, L.18; R., pp.114-16.) 
Mr. Murphy filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35.3 The 
district court explained why it decided the sentence was appropriate as it was. 
(R., pp.128-29.) As such, it denied Mr. Murphy's Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.126-30.) 
Mr. Murphy filed a notice of appeal that was timely from the order revoking his 
probation and imposing the sentence without modification. (R., pp.120-22.) On appeal, 
Mr. Murphy moved to augment the record with transcripts from the guilty plea hearing 
held on December 22, 2010, the sentencing hearing held on February 2, 2011, and the 
jurisdictional review hearing held on July 13, 2011. (Motion to Augment and Suspend 
the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed June 27, 2013.) The 
Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion without prejudice. (Order Denying Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule Without Prejudice, dated July 15, 2013 
(emphasis in original).) Mr. Murphy later renewed his motion, providing additional 
authorities and rationales demonstrating why the requested transcripts needed to be 
augmented to the appellate record. (Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed September 9, 2013.) The 
Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion without explanation. (Order Denying 
Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated September 
27, 2013 (emphasis in original).) 
3 There was no additional information attached to the Rule 35 motion itself, although it 
did indicate that Mr. Murphy anticipated filing letters of support or certificates of 
completion in support of his motion. (R., p.118.) However, no subsequent filings 
appear to have been made. (See generally R., pp.8-9 (Register of Actions for the 
relevant time period showing no additional filings by Mr. Murphy).) Mr. Murphy does not 
challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motion on appeal. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Murphy due process and equal 
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts 
necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Murphy's 
probation or, alternatively, when it executed his sentence without modification 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Murphy Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review 
Of The Issues On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
indigent defendants that they will not be denied access to transcripts which are relevant 
to issues they intend to raise on appeal. So long as the record reflects a colorable need 
for such a transcript, a court may not refuse to provide that transcript unless the State 
proves that the transcript is not relevant to an issue raised on appeal. 
Mr. Murphy has raised a challenge to the decision to revoke his probation and 
execute his sentence, or, alternatively, to not reduce his sentence sua sponte when it 
did so. To present those claims, he requested various transcripts be made part of the 
appellate record. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the request for the transcripts from 
the guilty plea hearing held on December 22, 2010, the sentencing hearing held on 
February 2, 2011, and the jurisdictional review hearing held on July 13, 2011. 
As such, Mr. Murphy is also challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his 
request for these transcripts. Mr. Murphy asserts that the requested transcripts are 
relevant to the challenge of the district court's decisions when it revoked his probation 
and executed his sentence because the applicable standard of review requires an 
appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the proceedings in 
order to properly evaluate the district court's decisions. 
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B. By Failing To Provide Mr. Murphy With Access To The Requested Transcripts, 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Murphy Due Process And Equal 
Protection Because He Cannot Obtain An Effective Appellate Review Of His 
Claims 
1. The United States Constitution And The Idaho Constitution Require, As 
Part Of Their Protections Of Due Process And Equal Protection, 
Transcripts Of Relevant Hearings To Be Provided To Indigent Defendants 
The United States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
guarantees criminal defendants due process and equal protection under the law. U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. Due process requires the defendant be 
given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 333 (1976); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Essentially, due process requires that judicial 
proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, 
452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho at 445. Those same standards have been 
applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of 
Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to an appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. If an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, such transcript 
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); I.C.R 5.2(a); 
I.C.R. 54.?(a). An order revoking probation is made after the judgment of conviction 
and affects the defendant's substantial rights. State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). As such, it may be appealed as a matter of right. I.AR 11 (c)(9); 
State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008). 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether 
transcripts must be provided when such a right is established. Its decisions have 
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established two fundamental themes. First, the scope of the due process and equal 
protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not 
tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review, 
but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. 
The seminal opinion from the United States Supreme Court is Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956). In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial 
court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript 
of the proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that 
time, the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death-penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that: 
[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age old 
problem .... Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim 
of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the law 
is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American 
court.' 
Id. at 16-17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)). As such, "[i]n 
criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account 
of religion, race, or color." Id. Furthermore: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
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poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. 
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript 
is not necessary in instances where a less expensive, but no less adequate, alternative 
exists. Id. at 20. 
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin when it struck 
down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be accompanied with a 
requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. See Bums v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252 (1959). The Court held: 
[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it 
may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure 
because of their poverty. This principle is no less applicable where the 
State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its 
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second 
phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency. 
Id. at 257. To permit otherwise, according to the Court, would result in an impermissible 
destruction of the defendant's ability to pursue the right afforded him by the State. Id. at 
258. 
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court clarified its statement in Griffin -
that a stenographic transcript is not necessary if an equivalent alternative is available. 
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963). To that end, the Court did note 
that "part or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to 
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds 
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unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id. at 495. However, the Court went on to 
discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance 
of the requested transcripts, and it ultimately concluded that the issues raised by those 
defendants could not be adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic 
transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
The United States Supreme Court continued to expand the protections identified 
in Griffin, applying them to non-felony offenses. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 
U.S. 189 (1971). Additionally, it placed the burden on the State to prove that the 
requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Id. at 
195. In doing so, the Court held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he or she needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. If 
a review of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts, it 
becomes the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary 
for the appeal. Id. 
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized 
and applied the United States Supreme Court's precedent in this regard. See, e.g., 
Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, if the record reflects 
that the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal and the State has not proved 
that they are unnecessary for appellate review thereof, due process and equal 
protection mandate that those transcripts be created and augmented to the record. 
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2. The Transcripts Requested By Mr. Murphy Are Relevant To The Issues 
He Has Raised On Appeal 
The requested transcripts are necessary to review Mr. Murphy's claim that the 
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or, alternatively, failed 
to reduce his sentence sua sponte when it did so. These transcripts are all necessary 
because the Idaho Supreme Court has decided that the appellate courts will conduct an 
independent review of the record available to the district court. State v. Pierce, 150 
Idaho 1, 5 (2010). Particularly, in probation revocation cases, such as this, the standard 
of review of probation violation cases involves a review of the entire record. See 
State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149 (1986). This includes information from the original 
sentencing hearing and the change of plea hearing where the district court heard from 
the defendant about the acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty. See 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that 
is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire 
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our 
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events 
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis 
added)). This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not required 
to state their sentencing rationale on the record. See State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 666 
(1984). 
The transcript from the December 22, 2010, guilty plea hearing is specifically 
necessary based on prior decisions by Idaho's appellate courts, which are, for the 
moment, good law. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Burdett has 
failed to include the transcript form his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the 
district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions 
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of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district 
court."); see a/so State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805 (1996) (applying the same 
presumption in absence of a complete record). The minutes from that hearing indicate 
that Mr. Murphy was "sworn and examined by the court" as to his intent to plead guilty 
and the nature of his plea agreement, and from that, it was determined that there was a 
factual basis for the plea. (R., pp.36-37.) Therefore, because his comments would be 
available for consideration at a future sentencing determination (like the one currently 
on appeal), they are part of the record an appellate court reviewing that future 
determination would consider. Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5; Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. As 
such, a transcript of the December 22, 2010, hearing should be augmented to the 
record 
The transcript from the February 2, 2011, sentencing hearing is specifically 
necessary because Mr. Murphy made a statement of allocution at that hearing. (R., 
p.47.) The defendant's statements in allocution are relevant to the sentencing 
determination. See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(finding that, while allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally 
protected right, as the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had suggested), rev. denied. 
Since such information would be available for consideration at a future sentencing 
determination, it is part of the record considered by the appellate courts reviewing that 
future sentencing determination. Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5; Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. 
Therefore, a transcript of that hearing should be augmented to the appellate record. 
The transcript from the July 13, 2011, jurisdictional review hearing is specifically 
necessary for similar reasons. Mr. Murphy was "sworn and examined by the court" and 
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made various statements, including statements concerning his application to treatment 
programs, such as drug court. (R., pp.70-71.) Rider review hearings, such as the one 
held on July 13, 2011, deal with similar concerns to sentencing hearings, since the 
district court is deciding whether or not to release the defendant on probation or execute 
his sentence and remand him to custody. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 
1990); see also State v. Meiwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). That decision is guided by 
the same factors that the district court considers at sentencing. See Meiwin, 131 Idaho 
at 648. Therefore, his statements at a rider review hearing have a similar impact to 
statements of allocution, which are important to sentencing determinations. See 
Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. Since all these statements 
speak to the sentencing factors, they would weigh into future sentencing 
determinations, and thus, are part of the record that an appellate court reviewing a 
future sentencing determination would consider. Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5; Hanington, 148 
Idaho at 28. Therefore, a transcript of this hearing should be augmented to the record. 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently discussed the scope of review of 
an order revoking a defendant's probation in response to a similar challenge. See 
Statev. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals held that the 
transcripts of the proceedings predating the probation violation currently on appeal were 
not necessary to the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the 
second probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it 
based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." 
Id. at 621. In reaching that decision, the Court of Appeals refused to address the 
defendant's claim that the Idaho Supreme Court had denied him due process on the 
basis that it does not have the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme 
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Court.4 Id. at 621. However, the Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the 
authority to review a renewed motion to augment, which contained information or 
argument not presented to the Idaho Supreme Court, if it was filed with the Court of 
Appeals after the case was assigned to it. Id.; see also State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 
793, 796 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied. Nevertheless, in cases where it has been 
presented with such a motion, it has denied the motion without explanation. See 
State v. Jorgensen, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 615, p.2 (Ct. App. August 5, 2013), 
pet. rev. filed. As such, it appears unlikely that filing a renewed motion with the Court of 
Appeals will lead to anything except a new, independent violation of Mr. Murphy's due 
process and equal protection rights. 
4 If the Court of Appeals is correct, and it is without authority to decide such questions, 
then an order assigning this case to the Court of Appeals would also constitute an 
independent violation of Mr. Murphy's state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. I § 13. As the Idaho Supreme 
Court has explained: 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
Card, 121 Idaho at 445. In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by 
statute. See I.C. § 19-2801. Defendants have the right to appeal from judgments 
affecting their substantial rights. Thomas, 146 Idaho at 594; I.A.R.11 (c)(9). The 
decision to revoke probation is such an order. Therefore, since the Fourteenth 
Amendment's protections apply to all proceedings affecting this appeal, the Idaho 
Supreme Court would violate those protections by assigning this case to the Court of 
Appeals knowing it was without authority to resolve the issues presented therein. 
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Despite asserting it was without authority to consider the issue, the Court of 
Appeals turned to the merits of the claim in Morgan, explaining that the scope of review 
for a revocation determination did not include a review of those previous hearings: 
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (emphasis in original). However, whether or not the transcripts of the requested 
proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation revocation 
hearing is irrelevant in regard to whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on 
appeal. 
In reaching a decision regarding the defendant's sentence, a district court is not 
limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal 
is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official 
position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 
2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings 
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard 
during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district 
court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the 
judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs 
therein involved"). In fact, the Court of Appeals has held that such review is not only 
proper, but is actually expected because "the judge hardly could be expected to 
disregard what he already knew about [the defendant] from the other case." 
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, whether the prior hearings 
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were transcribed at the time of the revocation hearing leading to the appeal is irrelevant 
because the district court may rely upon the information it already knows from presiding 
over the prior hearings when it made the sentencing decision after revoking probation. 
In fact, the reason that the appellate courts should look to the entire record when 
reviewing the executed sentence has been explained by the Court of Appeals: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order 
execution of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not 
artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment 
categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire 
course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. 
When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts. 
Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the 
defendant has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the 
probation is later revoked, and the sentence ordered into execution, does 
the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were 
we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived 
if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but 
suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive 
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be 
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do 
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As such, when an appellant 
files an appeal from a sentence executed after the revocation of probation, the 
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into 
the events which occurred prior to the probation revocation proceedings, as well as the 
events which occurred during those proceedings. 
The basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite 
properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in 
reaching a decision." Id. It follows that "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate 
court] should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the 
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district court must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition 
hearing in order for this standard to become applicable. To the contrary, the appellate 
courts will presume that the district court considered the prejudgment events when 
determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. See Sivak, 
105 Idaho at 907; Wallace, 98 Idaho at 321; Downing, 136 Idaho at 373-74; Gibson, 
106 Idaho at 495. Therefore, whether or not the prior hearings were transcribed is 
irrelevant, as an appellate court will assume that the district court will remember the 
events from the prior proceedings when it executes a sentence after revoking probation. 
See id. 
3. The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Mr. Murphy's Constitutional Rights By 
Denying His Motion To Augment The Record With The Relevant 
Transcripts 
Since the requested transcripts are relevant under the applicable standard of 
review, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Murphy access to those 
transcripts constitutes a violation of his due process and equal protection rights. See, 
e.g., Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Callaghan, 143 Idaho at 859. For example, when a 
verbatim transcript was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court, the 
courts improperly foreclosed access to the appellate process by denying indigent 
defendants access to such transcripts. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963). 
The United States Supreme Court made it clear that it is "constitutionally invalid ... to 
prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in 
Idaho, an appellant must provide an adequate record for review or face procedural 
default: "It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an 
adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of 
error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are 
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presumed to support the actions of the trial court."5 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 
(Ct. App. 1999); see a/so Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805 (applying this presumption in 
absence of a complete record). Therefore, if Mr. Murphy fails to provide the appellate 
court with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal presumption will 
apply and Mr. Murphy's claims regarding the excessiveness of his sentence will not be 
addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme 
Court not affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive him of an effective 
appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection 
grounds. See Lane, 372 U.S. at 480-85. 
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from access 
to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection and due 
process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. In that 
5 If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes of those hearings, it is 
possible the appellate courts might find that to be sufficient to conduct a meaningful 
appellate review, and so the transcripts are not necessary for appellate review in such a 
case. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate 
counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] 
Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). Given that 
holding, it is unlikely that the minutes will be sufficient to conduct a meaningful review, 
and thus, a record containing only the minutes is unlikely to comport with the 
constitutional requirements to provide due process and equal protection. 
For example, the minutes of the February 2, 2011, sentencing hearing only 
indicate that Mr. Murphy "makes statement." (R., p.47.) It does not make any reference 
to the contents of the statements. (See R., p.47.) The contents of those statements, 
particularly since they would be classified as the defendant's statements of allocution, 
are relevant to an abuse of discretion in sentencing claim, such as is being made in this 
case (see Section II, infra). See, e.g., Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Gervasi, 138 Idaho 
at 816. The same problem exists in regard to the minutes of the other hearings for 
which Mr. Murphy requested transcripts. (See, e.g., R., p.36 (minutes of December 22, 
2010, change of plea hearing, indicating that Mr. Murphy talked regarding "intent to 
plead guilty; written guilty plea; sworn and examined by the court"); R., p.70 (minutes of 
July 13, 2011, rider review hearing, indicating that Mr. Murphy talked regarding "intent to 
enter drug court; sworn and examined by the court"). Therefore, the minutes, which do 
not provide the substance of these statements, are insufficient in this case to provide for 
adequate review. See Murphy, 133 Idaho at 491. 
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situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at those 
hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to revoke 
probation. When Mr. Murphy was first placed on probation and given the opportunity for 
multiple periods of probation thereafter, the district court must have found, at each 
subsequent hearing, that the circumstances were right to give Mr. Murphy the 
opportunity to continue his rehabilitation as a member of society. See State v. Merwin, 
131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). Therefore, by placing Mr. Murphy on probation on each of 
those prior occasions, the district court must have determined that the mitigating factors 
presented outweighed the aggravating factors presented. See I.C. § 19-2521; Merwin, 
131 Idaho at 648. As such, to presume that the missing transcripts of those hearings 
supports the decision to relinquish jurisdiction ignores the mitigating factors that were 
present at those hearings and presents a negative, one-sided view of Mr. Murphy. As a 
result, the denial of access to the requested transcripts has prevented Mr. Murphy from 
addressing those positive factors in support of his appellate claims. In light of that 
denial, Mr. Murphy argues that the events which occurred at the subject hearings 
should, at least, be presumed to invalidate the district court's final sentencing decisions 
in this matter. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for 
an effective, merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to 
the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review for an appellate 
sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all 
the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not 
on the district court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on 
18 
appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As 
such, the decision to deny Mr. Murphy's request for the necessary transcripts will render 
his appeal ineffective and meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing 
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a 
procedural bar to the appellate review of Mr. Murphy's sentencing claims on the merits 
and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the 
presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Murphy's request for those transcripts 
was denied, that presumption means that the district court's sentencing decisions 
should be reversed. 
C. By Failing To Provide Mr. Murphy With Access To The Requested Transcripts, 
The Idaho Supreme Court Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot 
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
The United States Supreme Court, relying on Griffin, supra, and its progeny, has 
held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also gives 
defendants the right to counsel on appeal and requires effective representation: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). As 
such, the remaining issue is defining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a 
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments 
to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The 
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constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained 
where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client. ... [Counsel's] role 
as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability. Id.; 
see also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack 
of access to the requested transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a 
conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel 
from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise or whether there is factual 
support in favor of, or cutting against, any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Murphy has 
not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the merits of his claims 
and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the starting point for 
evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance in a criminal action is the 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991). These standards offer insight into the role 
and responsibilities of appellate counsel. Specifically, those standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
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decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to 
advise Mr. Murphy on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal. 
Mr. Murphy is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Murphy his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, which include the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be 
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity 
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of 
that review. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Murphy's Probation Or, 
Alternatively, When It Executed His Sentence Without Modification When It Did So 
A The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Murphy's Probation 
Mr. Murphy asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke 
probation and execute his unified sentences of ten years, with four years fixed, was an 
abuse of the district court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is one within 
the district court's discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The district court must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of 
rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection 
of society." Id. The Legislature has established the criteria for determining whether 
probation or incarceration is merited. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648 ( citing I.C. § 19-2521 ). 
In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered inquiry, 
determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
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discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and 
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13 
(citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). 
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, to be considered in that regard 
are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; 
(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. 
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects 
society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; 
State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of 
society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be 
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether 
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served 
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They 
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time 
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of 
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more 
lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). These same factors are 
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appropriately considered in regard to the decision to revoke probation. See 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106-07 (2009). 
In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Mr. Murphy. As a 
result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Mr. Murphy's probation was adequately 
serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from Mr. Murphy 
through incarceration. See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312. Therefore, this disposition 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
For example, while Mr. Murphy does have a criminal record, this is his first felony 
conviction. (See PSI, pp.2-6.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first 
offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." 
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595, (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)). Therefore, it 
considered the fact that it was the defendant's first felony to be a factor in mitigation. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
Furthermore, Mr. Murphy has employable skills. (PSI, p.11; Tr., p.17, L.18.) He 
has also been able to maintain steady employment. (See PSI, p.11.) This weighs in 
favor of probation because it means he will be more able to pay his outstanding fines, 
fees, costs, and restitution, which is a factor the district courts should consider. See 
I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(f). 
Finally, Mr. Murphy has shown amenability to treatment. He completed the rider 
program, earning a recommendation for probation from the program staff. (PSI, p.99.) 
Specifically, "[h]is instructor has nothing but positive comments about his good 
behavior, good sense of humor, and active participation in all aspects of the program. 
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Mr. Murphy has demonstrated through his work and behavior he is seriously invested in 
the program .... " (PSI, p.105.) He also completed the Ada County Jail Active 
Behavior Change Program and the Ada County Sheriff's Office Substance Abuse 
Program. (PSI, pp.85-86.) He had also begun to show some insight into his actions. 
(Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.17, L.6.) His issues in regard to drug court may also have been 
related to his mental health issues. Mr. Murphy indicated that he suffers from 
depression and anxiety, and is on a medication regimen to help him deal with those 
issues. (R., p.40; Tr., p.8, Ls.6-17.) The GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral 
Summary in his PSI indicates that he was having problems he associated with those 
conditions which were affecting his programming. (PSI, pp.93-94.) Idaho Code § 19-
2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing 
factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). As such, continued rehabilitation via 
continued probation should have been considered with efforts made to address the 
impact of Mr. Murphy's mental health issues on his programming. See id. 
However, the district court refused to continue considering rehabilitation in its 
sentencing determinations: "Quite frankly, you've had enough programming." 
(Tr., p.19, Ls.17-18.) By refusing to consider rehabilitative opportunities, the district 
court refused to consider one of the goals of sentencing that it is required to consider. 
See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568 That alone demonstrates 
the abuse of its discretion. See id. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that such a sentence, one 
which considers continued rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives -
protection of society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 
703, 713 {1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing 
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objectives). When a sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still 
imposes and executes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent 
effects of the imposed sentence are still present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 
14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses 
all the sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those 
objectives). In addition to restricting his liberty at the discretion of the Board of 
Correction and the looming sentence, he would also be deprived of several of his rights 
(such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the 
district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute the original 
sentence if Mr. Murphy were to fail to adhere to the terms of his probation. However, it 
could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives were properly addressed. What 
the probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the opportunity 
to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Murphy to apply the lessons he would 
gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting. 
B. Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing 
Mr. Murphy's Sentence When It Revoked Probation 
If the district court decides to resume the execution of the underlying sentence by 
revoking probation, it also has the authority to reduce the sentence, sua sponte, 
pursuant to Rule 35. State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008). The decision to not 
reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on appeal if it constitutes an 
abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 
2009). The standard of review and factors considered in such a decision are the same 
as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.; see Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568 (identifying 
the factors to be considered at sentencing). Therefore, the district court needed to 
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sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating 
factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should 
result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595. 
In this case, the evidence shows that Mr. Murphy had been making some 
progress in his programming (though admittedly, not up to the district court's 
expectations for the term of his drug court program). (Compare Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.17, L.6 
(noting that Mr. Murphy had begun to make progress) with Tr., p.18, Ls.11-21 (noting 
Mr. Murphy's issues in the drug court program).) As defense counsel noted, an 
exercise of discretion in this regard would afford Mr. Murphy to get into prison programs 
more quickly and would potentially allow him the opportunity for placement in a work 
center. (Tr., p.17, Ls.15-17.) 
Such a sentence would still address all the sentencing objectives - protection of 
society, punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence. See Ransom, 124 Idaho at 713 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). The 
more lenient sentence would still execute a sentence. Thus, even though the 
sentences in this case may be more lenient, they would still provide for a significant 
period of custodial supervision, if not incarceration. Such a sentence would punish 
Mr. Murphy by depriving him not only of his liberty for that period of time, but several of 
his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. 
Therefore, both retribution and deterrence would be served by a more lenient sentence. 
See, e.g., State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how even 
a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives). 
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In this case, the court would not lose anything in terms of protection of society, 
deterrence, or punishment by imposing a more lenient sentence. Society would receive 
equally similar protection in both cases, as Mr. Murphy would be in the custody of the 
Department of Correction either way. He would be unable to harm society during the 
period of initial incarceration, and the parole board would maintain the discretion of 
whether to release him again. 
What the more lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence 
would not is the opportunity to rehabilitate, and as the Supreme Court has noted, 
rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future. See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. 
Specifically, it would give him the opportunity to return to his family and build those 
relationships, offering and receiving support in that community. Failing to provide the 
rehabilitative alternatives would actually decrease the protection for society in the long 
term because such a sentence does not decrease the risk for recidivism as effectively 
as a sentence which does focus on rehabilitation. Therefore, the best way to protect 
society would be to provide Mr. Murphy with rehabilitative opportunities. To not do so 
results in lesser protection for society in the long term, which means the sentence fails 
to sufficiently address the primary sentencing objective, and thus requires modification. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Murphy respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Murphy respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or, in the 
alternative, remand the case for a new disposition hearing. 
DATED this 8th day of October, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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